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Abstract. We survey one area of the emerging ﬁeld of algorithmic game theory: the use of
approximation measures to quantify the inefﬁciency of game-theoretic equilibria. Potential
functions,whichenabletheapplicationofoptimizationtheorytothestudyofequilibria,havebeen
a versatile and powerful tool in this area. We use potential functions to bound the inefﬁciency of
equilibriainthreediverse,naturalclassesofgames: selﬁshroutingnetworks,resourceallocation
games, and Shapley network design games.
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1. Introduction
Theinterfacebetweentheoreticalcomputerscienceandmicroeconomics,oftencalled
algorithmic game theory, has been an extremely active research area over the past
few years. Recent points of contact between the two ﬁelds are diverse and include,
for example, increased attention to computational complexity and approximation in
combinatorialauctions(e.g.[9]);anewfocusonworst-caseanalysisinoptimalauction
design (e.g. [17]); and a renewed emphasis on the computability and learnability of
equilibriumconcepts(e.g.[14],[18],[26]). Thissurveytouchesonjustoneconnection
between theoretical computer science and game theory: the use of approximation
measures to quantify the inefﬁciency of game-theoretic equilibria.
1.1. Quantifying the inefﬁciency of equilibria. Even in very simple settings, self-
ish behavior can lead to highly inefﬁcient outcomes [11]. A canonical example of
this phenomenon is provided by the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” [28], in which strategic
behavior by two captured and separated prisoners inexorably draws them into the
worst-possible outcome. We will see several concrete examples of the inefﬁciency of
selﬁsh behavior in networks later in the survey.
Must more recently, researchers have sought to quantify the inefﬁciency of selﬁsh
behavior. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [23] proposed a framework to systemati-
cally study this issue. The framework presupposes a strategic environment (a game),
a deﬁnition for the outcome of selﬁsh behavior (an equilibrium concept), and a real-
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valued, nonnegative objective function deﬁned on the possible outcomes of the game.
The price of anarchy [23], [26] is then deﬁned as the ratio between the objective
functionvalueofanequilibriumandthatofanoptimalsolution. (Forthemoment, we
ignore the question of whether or not equilibria exist and are unique.) If the price of
anarchyofagameis1,thenitsequilibriaarefullyefﬁcient. Moregenerally,bounding
the price of anarchy in a class of games provides a guarantee on the worst-possible
inefﬁciency of equilibria in these games.
Thepriceofanarchyisdirectlyinspiredbyotherpopularnotionsofapproximation
in theoretical computer science [23]. One example is the approximation ratio of a
heuristic for a (typically NP-hard) optimization problem, deﬁned as the largest ratio
between the objective function value of the solution produced by the heuristic and
that of an optimal solution. While the approximation ratio measures the worst-case
loss in solution quality due to insufﬁcient computational effort, the price of anarchy
measurestheworst-caselossarisingfrominsufﬁcientability(orwillingness)tocontrol
and coordinate the actions of selﬁsh individuals. Much recent research on the price
of anarchy is motivated by optimization problems that naturally occur in the design
and management of large networks (like the Internet), in which users act selﬁshly, but
implementing an optimal solution is not practical.
1.2. Potential functions. The price of anarchy has been successfully analyzed in a
diversearrayofgame-theoreticmodels(seee.g.[32], [33]andthereferencestherein).
Thissurveydiscussesthreeofthesemodels,withthegoalofillustratingasinglemath-
ematical tool for bounding the price of anarchy: potential functions. The potential
function technique is by no means the only one known for bounding the inefﬁciency
of equilibria, but (so far) it has been the most versatile and powerful.
Potential functions enable the application of optimization theory to the study of
equilibria. More precisely, a potential function for a game is a real-valued function,
deﬁned on the set of possible outcomes of the game, such that the equilibria of the
game are precisely the local optima of the potential function. This idea was ﬁrst used
to analyze selﬁsh behavior in networks by Beckmann, McGuire, and Winsten [4],
though similar ideas were used earlier in other contexts.
When a game admits a potential function, there are typically consequences for
the existence, uniqueness, and inefﬁciency of equilibria. For example, suppose a
game admits a potential function and either: (1) there are a ﬁnite number of distinct
outcomes; or (2) the set of outcomes is compact and the potential function is contin-
uous. In either case, the potential function achieves a global optimum, which is also
a local optimum, and hence the game has at least one equilibrium. This is a much
more elementary approach to establishing the existence of equilibria than traditional
ﬁxed-point proofs (e.g. [25]). Moreover, if the potential function has a unique local
optimum, then the game has a unique equilibrium. Finally, if the potential function
is “close to” the true objective function, then the equilibria that are global optima
of the potential function have nearly-optimal objective function value, and are thus
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The power of the potential function approach might suggest that its applicability
is limited. Fortunately, many important and natural classes of games admit well-
behaved potential functions. To suggest what such functions look like, we brieﬂy
interpretsomeclassicalresultsaboutelectricnetworksintermsofpotentialfunctions.
Consider electrical current in a two-terminal network of resistors. By Kirchhoff’s
equations and Ohm’s law, we can interpret this current as an “equilibrium”, in the
sense that it equalizes the voltage drop along all paths in the network between the two
terminals. (View current as a large population of “selﬁsh particles”, each seeking out
a path with minimum voltage drop.) On the other hand, Thomson’s principle states
that electrical current also minimizes the dissipated energy over all ﬂow patterns that
achievethesametotalcurrent. Inotherwords, energydissipationservesasapotential
function for current in an electrical network. For further details and discussion, see
Kelly [21] and Doyle and Snell [10].
1.3. Survey overview. Each of the next three sections introduces a model of self-
ish behavior in networks, and uses a potential function to bound the inefﬁciency of
equilibria in the model. We focus on these three examples because they are simple,
natural, and diverse enough to illustrate different aspects of potential function proof
techniques. In order to emphasize the most important concepts and provide a number
of self-contained proofs, we often discuss only special cases of more general models
and results.
Section2discussesselﬁshroutingnetworks,amodelthatgeneralizestheelectrical
networks of Subsection 1.2 and has been extensively studied by the transportation,
networking, and theoretical computer science communities. Section 3 analyzes the
performance of a well-studied distributed protocol for allocating resources to hetero-
geneous users. Section 4 bounds the inefﬁciency of equilibria in a model of selﬁsh
network design. Section 5 concludes.
2. Selﬁsh routing and the price of anarchy
2.1. The model. In this section, we study the inefﬁciency of equilibria in the fol-
lowing model of noncooperative network routing. A multicommodity ﬂow network,
or simply a network, is a ﬁnite directed graph G = (V,E), with vertex set V and
(directed) edge set E, together with a set (s1,t 1),...,(s k,t k) of source-sink vertex
pairs. We also call such pairs commodities. We denote the set of simple si-ti paths
by Pi, and always assume that this set is non-empty for each i. We allow the graph G
to contain parallel edges, and a vertex can participate in multiple source-sink pairs.
A ﬂow in a network G is a nonnegative vector indexed by the set P =
k
i=1 Pi.
Foraﬂowf andapathP ∈ Pi,weinterpretfP astheamountoftrafﬁcofcommodityi
thatchoosesthepathP totravelfromsi toti. Weuser todenoteanonnegativevector
oftrafﬁcrates, indexedbythecommoditiesofG. Aﬂowf isfeasibleforr ifitroutes
all of the prescribed trafﬁc: for each i ∈{ 1,2,...,k},

P∈Pi fP = ri.1074 Tim Roughgarden
We model the negative consequences of network congestion in the following sim-
ple way. For a ﬂow f in a network G and an edge e of G, let fe =

P∈P :e∈P fP
denote the total amount of trafﬁc employing edge e. Each edge e then has a non-
negative, continuous, and nondecreasing cost function ce, which describes the cost
incurred by trafﬁc using the edge e as a function of fe. We call a triple of the form
(G,r,c)a selﬁsh routing network or simply an instance.
Nextwedescribeanotionofequilibriuminselﬁshroutingnetworks–theexpected
outcome of “selﬁsh routing”. Deﬁne the cost of a path P with respect to a ﬂow f as
the sum of the costs of the constituent edges: cP(f) =

e∈P ce(fe). Assuming that
selﬁshtrafﬁcattemptstominimizeitsincurredcost,weobtainthefollowingdeﬁnition
of a Wardrop equilibrium [38].
Deﬁnition 2.1 ([38]). Let f be a feasible ﬂow for the instance (G,r,c). The ﬂow f
is a Wardrop equilibrium if, for every commodity i ∈{ 1,2,...,k} and every pair
P, ˜ P ∈ Pi of si-ti paths with fP > 0, cP(f) ≤ c ˜ P(f).
In Deﬁnition 2.1, we are implicitly assuming that every network user controls a
negligible portion of the overall trafﬁc, so that the actions of an individual user have
essentially no effect on the network congestion. In the game theory literature, games
with this property are called nonatomic [35]. Atomic variants of selﬁsh routing have
also been extensively studied (see e.g. [32]). We will study other types of atomic
games in Sections 3 and 4.
Example 2.2 (Pigou’s example [27]). Consider the two-vertex, two-edge network
shown in Figure 1. There is one commodity and the trafﬁc rate is 1. Note that the
lower edge is cheaper than the upper edge if and only if less than one unit of trafﬁc
uses it. There is thus a unique Wardrop equilibrium, with all trafﬁc routed on the
lower edge. In this ﬂow, all trafﬁc incurs one unit of cost.
s t
c(x) = 1
c(x) = x
Figure 1. Pigou’s example (Example 2.2).
Pigou’s example already illustrates that equilibria can be inefﬁcient. More specif-
ically, note that routing half of the trafﬁc on each of the two edges would produce a
“better” ﬂow: all of the trafﬁc would incur at most one unit of cost, while half of the
trafﬁc would incur only 1/2 units of cost.Potential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1075
The inefﬁciency of the Wardrop equilibrium in Example 2.2 arises from what is
oftencalledacongestionexternality–aselﬁshnetworkuseraccountsonlyforitsown
cost, and not for the costs that its decision imposes on others. The “better” routing
of trafﬁc in Example 2.2 is not a Wardrop equilibrium because a selﬁsh network user
routed on the upper edge would switch to the lower edge, indifferent to the fact that
this switch (slightly) increases the cost incurred by a large portion of the population.
In Example 2.2, there is a uniqueWardrop equilibrium. In Subsection 2.2 we will
use a potential function to prove the following theorem, which states that Wardrop
equilibria exist and are “essentially unique” in all selﬁsh routing networks.
Theorem 2.3 ([4]). Let (G,r,c)be an instance.
(a) The instance (G,r,c)admits at least one Wardrop equilibrium.
(b) If f and ˜ f areWardrop equilibria for (G,r,c), then ce(fe) = ce( ˜ fe) for every
edge e.
TheWardropequilibriuminExample2.2isintuitivelyinefﬁcient;wenextquantify
this inefﬁciency. We deﬁne our objective function, the cost of a ﬂow, as the sum of
the path costs incurred by trafﬁc:
C(f) =

P∈P
cP(f)fP =

e∈E
ce(fe)fe. (1)
The ﬁrst equality in (1) is a deﬁnition; the second follows easily from the deﬁnitions.
An optimal ﬂow for an instance (G,r,c)is feasible and minimizes the cost. Since
cost functions are continuous and the set of feasible ﬂows is compact, every instance
admits an optimal ﬂow. In Pigou’s example (Example 2.2), the Wardrop equilibrium
has cost 1, while routing half of the trafﬁc on each edge yields an optimal ﬂow with
cost 3/4.
Deﬁnition 2.4 ([23], [26]). The price of anarchy ρ(G,r,c)of an instance (G,r,c)is
ρ(G,r,c)=
C(f)
C(f∗)
,
where f is a Wardrop equilibrium and f ∗ is an optimal ﬂow. The price of anarchy
ρ( ) of a non-empty set   of instances is sup(G,r,c)∈  ρ(G,r,c).
Deﬁnition 2.1 and Theorem 2.3(b) easily imply that all Wardrop equilibria have
equal cost, and thus the price of anarchy of an instance is well deﬁned unless there is
a ﬂow with zero cost. In this case, all Wardrop equilibria also have zero cost, and we
deﬁne the price of anarchy of the instance to be 1.
Example 2.5 (Nonlinear Pigou’s example [34]). The inefﬁciency of the Wardrop
equilibrium in Example 2.2 can be ampliﬁed with a seemingly minor modiﬁcation
to the network. Suppose we replace the previously linear cost function c(x) = x on1076 Tim Roughgarden
the lower edge with the highly nonlinear one c(x) = xp for p large (Figure 2). As
in Example 2.2, the cost of the unique Wardrop equilibrium is 1. The optimal ﬂow
routes a small ε fraction of the trafﬁc on the upper edge and has cost ε +(1−ε)p+1.
Since this approaches 0 as ε tends to 0 and p tends to inﬁnity, the price of anarchy of
this selﬁsh routing network grows without bound as p grows large.
s t
c(x) = 1
c(x) = xp
Figure 2. A nonlinear variant of Pigou’s example (Example 2.5).
Example 2.5 demonstrates that the price of anarchy can be large in (very simple)
networks with nonlinear cost functions. In Subsection 2.2 we use a potential function
to show the converse: the price of anarchy is large only in networks with “highly
nonlinear” cost functions.
2.2. A potential function for wardrop equilibria. We now show that Wardrop
equilibria can be characterized as the minima of a potential function, and use this
characterization to prove bothTheorem 2.3 and upper bounds on the price of anarchy
ofselﬁshrouting. Tomotivatethispotentialfunction,weﬁrstcharacterizetheoptimal
ﬂows of an instance.
Optimal ﬂows for an instance (G,r,c)minimize the cost (1) subject to linear ﬂow
feasibility constraints. Assume for the moment that for every edge e, the function
x · ce(x) is convex. The cost (1) is then a convex (separable) function, and we can
apply the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (see e.g. [5]) to characterize its global
minima. To state this characterization cleanly, assume further that all cost functions
aredifferentiable, andletc∗
e(x) = (x·ce(x))  = ce(x)+x·c 
e(x)denotethemarginal
cost function for the edge e. The KKT conditions then give the following.
Proposition 2.6 ([4]). Let (G,r,c)be an instance such that, for every edge e, the
functionx·ce(x)isconvexanddifferentiable. Letc∗
e denotethemarginalcostfunction
of the edge e. Then f ∗ is an optimal ﬂow for (G,r,c) if and only if, for every
commodity i ∈{ 1,2,...,k} and every pair P, ˜ P ∈ Pi of si-ti paths with fP > 0,
c∗
P(f) ≤ c∗
˜ P(f).
Comparing Deﬁnition 2.1 and Proposition 2.6, we discover that Wardrop equilib-
ria and optimal ﬂows are essentially the same thing, just with different sets of cost
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Corollary 2.7. Let (G,r,c)be an instance such that, for every edge e, the function
x · ce(x) is convex and differentiable. Let c∗
e denote the marginal cost function of
the edge e. Then f ∗ is an optimal ﬂow for (G,r,c)if and only if it is a Wardrop
equilibrium for (G,r,c∗).
ToconstructapotentialfunctionforWardropequilibria,weneedto“invert”Corol-
lary 2.7: of what function doWardrop equilibria arise as global minima? The answer
is simple: to recover Deﬁnition 2.1 as an optimality condition, we seek a function
he(x)foreachedgee–playingthepreviousroleofx·ce(x)–suchthath 
e(x) = ce(x).
Settinghe(x) =
 x
0 ce(y)dy foreachedgeethusyieldsthedesiredpotentialfunction.
Precisely, call
 (f) =

e∈E
 fe
0
ce(x)dx (2)
the potential function for an instance (G,r,c). Analogously to Corollary 2.7, the
following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.8 ([4]). Let (G,r,c)be an instance. A ﬂow feasible for (G,r,c)is
a Wardrop equilibrium if and only if it is a global minimum of the corresponding
potential function   given in (2).
Remark 2.9. Thomson’s principle for electrical networks (Subsection 1.2) can be
viewed as the special case of Proposition 2.8 for single-commodity ﬂow networks
with linear cost functions (of the form ce(x) = aex).
Theorem 2.3 now follows easily.
Proof of Theorem 2.3 (Sketch). Since cost functions are continuous and the set of
feasible ﬂows is compact, part (a) of the theorem follows immediately from Propo-
sition 2.8 and Weierstrass’s Theorem. Since cost functions are nondecreasing, the
potential function   in (2) is convex; moreover, the set of feasible ﬂows is convex.
Part (b) of the theorem now follows from routine convexity arguments. 
Much more recently, the potential function (2) has been used to upper bound the
price of anarchy of selﬁsh routing. The intuition behind this connection is simple: if
Wardrop equilibria exactly optimize a potential function (2) that is a good approxi-
mation of the objective function (1), then they should also be approximately optimal.
Formally, we have the following.
Theorem 2.10 ([34]). Let (G,r,c) be an instance, and suppose that x · ce(x) ≤
γ ·
 x
0 ce(y)dy for all e ∈ E and x ≥ 0. Then the price of anarchy ρ(G,r,c) is at
most γ.
Proof. Let f and f ∗ be a Wardrop equilibrium and an optimal ﬂow for (G,r,c),
respectively. Since cost functions are nondecreasing, the cost of a ﬂow (1) is always1078 Tim Roughgarden
at least its potential function value (2). The hypothesis ensures that the cost of a ﬂow
is at most γ times its potential function value. The theorem follows by writing
C(f) ≤ γ ·  (f) ≤ γ ·  (f∗) ≤ γ · C(f∗),
with the second inequality following from Proposition 2.8. 
Theorem 2.10 implies that the price of anarchy of selﬁsh routing is large only
in networks with “highly nonlinear” cost functions. For example, if ce is a polyno-
mial function with degree at most p and nonnegative coefﬁcients, then x · ce(x) ≤
(p + 1)
 x
0 ce(y)dy for all x ≥ 0. Applying Theorem 2.10, we ﬁnd that the price
of anarchy in networks with cost functions that are polynomials with nonnegative
coefﬁcients grows at most linearly with the degree bound p.
Corollary 2.11 ([34]). If (G,r,c)is an instance with cost functions that polynomials
with nonnegative coefﬁcients and degree at most p, then ρ(G,r,c)≤ p + 1.
This upper bound is nearly matched by Example 2.5. (The upper and lower
bounds differ by roughly a lnp multiplicative factor.) Qualitatively, Example 2.5 and
Corollary 2.11 imply that a large price of anarchy can be caused by highly nonlin-
ear cost functions, but not by complex network topologies or by a large number of
commodities.
2.3. An optimal bound on the price of anarchy. We have established that the price
of anarchy of selﬁsh routing depends on the “degree of nonlinearity” of the network
cost functions. However, even in the simple case of polynomial cost functions, there
is gap between the lower bound on the price of anarchy provided by Example 2.5
and the upper bound of Theorem 2.10. We conclude this section by showing how a
different analysis, which can be regarded as a more “global” application of potential
function ideas, provides a tight bound on the price of anarchy for essentially every set
of allowable cost functions.
We ﬁrst formalize a natural lower bound on the price of anarchy based on “Pigou-
like examples”.
Deﬁnition 2.12 ([7], [31]). Let C be a nonempty set of cost functions. The Pigou
bound α(C) for C is
α(C) = sup
c∈C
sup
x,r≥0
r · c(r)
x · c(x) + (r − x)c(r)
, (3)
with the understanding that 0/0 = 1.
The point of the Pigou bound is that it lower bounds the price of anarchy in
instances with cost functions in C.
Proposition 2.13. Let C be a set of cost functions that contains all of the constant
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Proof. Fix a choice of c ∈ C and x,r ≥ 0. We can complete the proof by exhibit-
ing a selﬁsh routing network with cost functions in C and price of anarchy at least
c(r)r/[c(x)x +(r −x)c(r)]. Since c is nondecreasing, this expression is at least 1 if
x ≥ r; we can therefore assume that x<r .
Let G be a two-vertex, two-edge network as in Figure 1. Give the lower edge the
costfunctionc1(y) = c(y)andtheupperedgetheconstantcostfunctionc2(y) = c(r).
By assumption, both of these cost functions lie in C. Set the trafﬁc rate to r. Routing
all of the trafﬁc on the lower edge yields a Wardrop equilibrium with cost c(r)r.
Routing x units of trafﬁc on the lower edge and r − x units of trafﬁc on the upper
edge gives a feasible ﬂow with cost [c(x)x + (r − x)c(r)]. The price of anarchy in
this instance is thus at least c(r)r/[c(x)x + (r − x)c(r)], as desired 
Proposition 2.13 holds more generally for every set C of cost functions that is
inhomogeneous in the sense that c(0)>0 for some c ∈ C [31].
Wenextshowthat,eventhoughthePigouboundisbasedonlyonPigou-likeexam-
ples, itisalsoanupperboundonthepriceofanarchyingeneralmulticommodityﬂow
networks. The proof requires the following variational inequality characterization of
Wardrop equilibria, ﬁrst noted by Smith [36].
Proposition 2.14 ([36]). A ﬂow f feasible for (G,r,c)is a Wardrop equilibrium if
and only if 
e∈E
ce(fe)fe ≤

e∈E
ce(fe)f ∗
e
for every ﬂow f ∗ feasible for (G,r,c).
Proposition 2.14 can be derived as an optimality condition for minimizers of the
potential function (2), or can be proved directly using Deﬁnition 2.1.
We now show that the Pigou bound is tight.
Theorem 2.15 ([7], [31]). Let C be a set of cost functions and α(C) the Pigou bound
for C.I f(G,r,c)is an instance with cost functions in C, then
ρ(G,r,c)≤ α(C).
Proof. Let f ∗ and f be an optimal ﬂow and aWardrop equilibrium, respectively, for
an instance (G,r,c)with cost functions in the set C. The theorem follows by writing
C(f∗) =

e∈E
ce(f ∗
e )f ∗
e
≥
1
α(C)

e∈E
ce(fe)fe +

e∈E
(f ∗
e − fe)ce(fe)
≥
C(f)
α(C)
,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Deﬁnition 2.12 and the second from Proposi-
tion 2.14. 1080 Tim Roughgarden
Different, more recent proofs of Theorem 2.15 can be found in [8], [37].
Proposition 2.13 and Theorem 2.15 establish the qualitative statement that, for
essentially every ﬁxed restriction on the allowable network cost functions, the price
of anarchy is maximized by Pigou-like examples. Determining the largest-possible
price of anarchy in Pigou-like examples (i.e., the Pigou bound) is a tractable problem
in many cases. For example, it is precisely 4/3 when C is the afﬁne functions [34],
and more generally is [1 − p · (p + 1)−(p+1)/p]−1 ≈ p/lnp when C is the set of
polynomials with degree at most p and nonnegative coefﬁcients [31]. In these cases,
themaximumpriceofanarchy(amongallmulticommodityﬂownetworks)isachieved
by the instances in Examples 2.2 and 2.5. For further examples, see [7], [31].
Formuchmoreontopicsrelatedtothepriceofanarchyofselﬁshrouting,including
many extensions and generalizations of the results described in this section, see [32],
[33] and the references therein.
3. Efﬁciency loss in resource allocation protocols
Wenextstudytheperformanceofaprotocolforallocatingresourcestoheterogeneous
users. Whilethereareanumberofconceptualdifferencesbetweenthismodelandthe
selﬁsh routing networks of Section 2, the inefﬁciency of equilibria in these models
can be analyzed in a similar way.
3.1. The model. We consider a single divisible resource – the capacity of a single
network link, say – to be allocated to a ﬁnite number n>1 of competing users.
These users are heterogeneous in the sense that different users can have different
values for capacity. We model this by giving each user i a nonnegative real-valued
utility function Ui that expresses this user’s value for a given amount of capacity. We
assume that each Ui is concave, strictly increasing, and continuously differentiable.
A resource allocation game is deﬁned by the n utility functions U1,...,U n and the
link capacity C>0.
An allocation for a resource allocation game is a nonnegative vector (x1,...,x n)
with
n
i=1 xi = C. We study the following protocol for allocating capacity. Each
user i submits a nonnegative bid bi for capacity. The protocol allocates capacity in
proportion to bids, with
xi =
bi n
j=1 bj
· C (4)
units of capacity allocated to user i. The payoff Qi to a user i is deﬁned as its value
for the capacity it receives, minus the bid that it made (and presumably now has to
pay):
Qi(b1,...,b n) = Ui(xi) − bi = Ui

bi n
j=1 bj
· C

− bi.
Assume that if all users bid zero, then all users receive zero payoff.Potential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1081
An equilibrium is then a bid vector in which each user bids optimally, given
the bids of the other users. To state this precisely, we use the notation b−i =
(b1,b 2,...,b i−1,b i+1,...,b n)todenotethebidsoftheusersotherthani,andsome-
times write (bi,b −i) for a bid vector (b1,...,b n).
Deﬁnition 3.1. A bid vector (b1,...,b n) is an equilibrium of the resource allocation
game (U1,...,U n,C)if for every user i ∈{ 1,2,...,n},
Qi(bi,b −i) = sup
˜ bi≥0
Qi(˜ bi,b −i). (5)
One easily checks that in every equilibrium, at least two users submit strictly
positive bids.
Whileequilibriaaremostnaturallydeﬁnedforbidvectors, wewillbeinterestedin
thequalityofthecorrespondingallocations. Anequilibriumallocationisanallocation
(x1,...,x n) induced by an equilibrium bid vector – i.e., there is an equilibrium
(b1,...,b n) such that (4) holds for each user i. We next give a characterization
of equilibrium allocations that will be crucial for designing a potential function for
resource allocation games.
First, a simple calculation shows that concavity of the utility function Ui (in xi)
impliesstrictconcavityofthepayofffunctionQi (inbi)foreveryﬁxedvectorb−i with
at least one strictly positive component. Similarly, the latter function is continuously
differentiable for each such ﬁxed b−i. We can therefore characterize solutions to (5)
via standard ﬁrst-order optimality conditions, which yields the following.
Proposition 3.2 ([16], [20]). Let (U1,...,U n,C)be a resource allocation game and
(b1,...,b n) a bid vector with at least two strictly positive bids. Let B =
n
j=1 bj
denote the sum of the bids. This bid vector is an equilibrium if and only if
U 
i

bi
B
· C

1 −
bi
B

≤
B
C
for every user i ∈{ 1,2,...,n}, with equality holding whenever bi > 0.
ReformulatingProposition3.2intermsofallocationsgivesthefollowingcorollary
(cf., Deﬁnition 2.1).
Corollary3.3([16],[20]). Let(U1,...,U n,C)bearesourceallocationgame. Anal-
location(x1,...,x n)isanequilibriumifandonlyifforeverypairi,j ∈{ 1,2,...,n}
of users with xi > 0,
U 
i(xi)
	
1 −
xi
C


≥ U 
j(xj)
	
1 −
xj
C


.
Proof. The “only if” direction follows easily from Proposition 3.2 and equation (4).
For the “if” direction, suppose (x1,...,x n) satisﬁes the stated condition. There is
then a scalar λ ≥ 0 such that U 
i(xi)[1 − (xi/C)]≤λ for all users i, with equality
holding whenever xi > 0. Setting bi = λxi for each i yields a bid vector that meets
the equilibrium condition in Proposition 3.2. 1082 Tim Roughgarden
Example 3.4 ([20]). Consider a resource allocation game in which the capacity C
is 1, one user has the utility function U1(x1) = 2x1, and the other n − 1 users have
the utility function Ui(xi) = xi. Corollary 3.3 implies that in the unique equilibrium
allocation, the ﬁrst user receives 1
2 + ε units of capacity, while each of the other
n−1 users receive δ units of capacity (with ε,δ → 0a sn →∞ ). In this allocation,
U 
i(xi)(1−xi)isthesameforeachuseri,andisslightlylessthan1. Thecorresponding
equilibrium bid vector is roughly the same as the equilibrium allocation vector.
In the next subsection, we use a potential function to show that every resource
allocation game has a unique equilibrium allocation.
We claim that the equilibrium allocation in Example 3.4 is suboptimal. As in the
previous section, we formalize this claim by introducing an objective function and
studying the price of anarchy. We deﬁne the efﬁciency of an allocation (x1,...,x n)
of a resource allocation game to be the sum of the users’utilities:
E(x1,...,x n) =
n 
i=1
Ui(xi). (6)
An optimal allocation has the maximum-possible efﬁciency.
ThepriceofanarchyofaresourceallocationgameistheratioE(x)/E(x∗),wherex
is the equilibrium allocation and x∗ is an optimal allocation. Note that the price of
anarchy of such a game is at most 1. In Example 3.4, the optimal allocation gives
all of the capacity to the ﬁrst user and has efﬁciency 2. The equilibrium allocation
has efﬁciency approaching 3/2a sn →∞ ; the price of anarchy can therefore be
arbitrarily close to 3/4 in this family of examples.
Why does inefﬁciency arise in Example 3.4? First, note that if the ﬁrst user is the
onlyonebiddingastrictlypositiveamount(leadingtotheoptimalallocation),thenthe
bid vector cannot be an equilibrium: the ﬁrst user can bid a smaller positive amount
andcontinuetoreceiveallofthecapacity. Asimilarargumentholdswhenevertheﬁrst
user’sbidcomprisesasufﬁcientlylargefractionofthesumoftheusers’bids: iftheﬁrst
userlowersitsbid,itsallocationdiminishes,butthepriceitpaysperunitofbandwidth
decreases by a large enough amount to increase its overall payoff. This intuition is
mathematically reﬂected in Corollary 3.3 in the term U 
i(xi)(1 − xi) – the marginal
beneﬁt of increased capacity to a user becomes increasing tempered as its allocation
grows. Inefﬁciency thus arises in Example 3.4 because of “market power” – the fact
that the actions of a single user have signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the effective price of
capacity. Indeed, resourceallocationgameswereinitiallystudiedbyKelly[22]under
the assumption that no users have nontrivial market power. Under this assumption,
equilibria are fully efﬁcient – i.e., the price of anarchy is always 1 [22]. See [19,
§1.3–1.4] for further discussion.
Remark3.5. Selﬁshroutingnetworksandresourceallocationgamesdifferinanum-
berofways. Intheformer,thereisacontinuumofselﬁshnetworkusersthateachhave
a ﬁnite set of strategies (paths); in the latter, there is a ﬁnite set of users, each with aPotential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1083
continuum of strategies (bids). In selﬁsh routing, the objective is cost minimization;
inresourceallocation, itisefﬁciencymaximization. Finally, andperhapsmostfunda-
mentally, inefﬁciency appears to arise for different reasons in the two models. Recall
that in selﬁsh routing networks, inefﬁciency stems from congestion externalities (see
the discussion following Example 2.2). Example 3.4 shows that market power is
the culprit behind inefﬁcient equilibria in resource allocation games. Despite all of
these conceptual differences, the next two subsections show that the inefﬁciency of
equilibria can be quantiﬁed in the two models via remarkably similar analyses.
3.2. A potential function for equilibria. As in Subsection 2.2, our ﬁrst step toward
constructingapotentialfunctionforequilibriumallocationsistocharacterizeoptimal
allocations. Since efﬁciency (6) is a separable concave function, a straightforward
application of ﬁrst-order optimality conditions yields the following.
Proposition 3.6. Let (U1,...,U n,C)be a resource allocation game. An allocation
(x1,...,x n) is optimal if and only if for every pair i,j ∈{ 1,2,...,n} of users with
xi > 0, U 
i(xi) ≥ U 
j(xj).
Given the near-identical characterizations of equilibrium and optimal allocations
in Corollary 3.3 and Proposition 3.6, respectively, we again ask: of what function
does an equilibrium allocation arise as the global maximum? To recover Corol-
lary 3.3 as an optimality condition, we seek a function Hi for each user i such that
H 
i(xi) = U 
i(xi)[1−(xi/C)] for all xi ≥ 0. Setting Hi(xi) = Ui(xi)[1−(xi/C)]+  xi
0 Ui(y)dy

/C thus yields the desired potential function. Precisely, for the re-
source allocation game (U1,...,U n,C), deﬁne
 RA(x1,...,x n) =
n 
i=1
ˆ Ui(xi), (7)
where
ˆ Ui(xi) =
	
1 −
xi
C


· Ui(xi) +
xi
C
·

1
xi
 xi
0
Ui(y)dy

. (8)
A simple calculation shows that each function ˆ Ui is strictly concave, increasing,
and continuously differentiable. Regarding ( ˆ U1,..., ˆ Un,C)as a resource allocation
game, applying Proposition 2.6 to it, and appealing to Corollary 3.3 formalizes the
fact that  RA is a potential function.
Proposition 3.7 ([16], [20]). An allocation of the game (U1,...,U n,C)is an equi-
librium allocation if and only if it is a global maximum of the corresponding potential
function  RA.
Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium allocations follow immediately.
Proposition 3.8 ([16], [20]). In every resource allocation game, there is a unique
equilibrium allocation.1084 Tim Roughgarden
Proof. Existence follows from Proposition 3.7 and the facts that the potential func-
tion (7) is continuous and the set of all allocations is compact. Uniqueness follows
fromProposition3.7andthefactthatthepotentialfunction(7)isstrictlyconcave. 
Proposition 3.7 also has consequences for the price of anarchy in resource allo-
cation games. To see why, note that the value of ˆ Ui(xi) in (8) can be viewed as a
weightedaverageoftwoquantities–the“trueutility”Ui(xi)andthe“averageutility”  xi
0 Ui(y)dy

/xi. Since Ui is increasing, the latter quantity can only underestimate
the utility Ui(xi), and hence ˆ Ui(xi) ≤ Ui(xi) for all i and xi ≥ 0. On the other hand,
since Ui is nonnegative and concave, the average utility between 0 and xi is at least
half of the utility Ui(xi) at xi. Thus ˆ Ui(xi) ≥ Ui(xi)/2 for all i and xi ≥ 0. It follows
that
E(x1,...,x n) ≥  RA(x1,...,x n) ≥ E(x1,...,x n)/2
for every allocation (x1,...,x n). Following the proof of Theorem 2.10 now gives a
lower bound of 1/2 on the price of anarchy in resource allocation games.
Theorem 3.9 ([20]). In every resource allocation game, the price of anarchy is at
least 1/2.
3.3. An optimal bound on the price of anarchy. There is a gap between the lower
bound of 1/2 on the price of anarchy given in Theorem 3.9 and the upper bound of
3/4 that is achieved (in the limit) in Example 3.4. As in Subsection 3.3, an optimal
(lower) bound can be obtained by leveraging the potential function characterization
of equilibria (Proposition 3.7) in a less crude way. Our argument will again be based
on a “variational inequality”, which can be derived directly from Corollary 3.3 or
viewed as a ﬁrst-order optimality condition for the potential function (7).
Proposition 3.10. Let(U1,...,U n,C)bearesourceallocationgame. Foreachuser
i, deﬁne the modiﬁed utility function ˆ Ui as in (8). An allocation ˆ x is an equilibrium
for (U1,...,U n,C)if and only if
n 
i=1
ˆ U 
i(ˆ xi)ˆ xi ≥
n 
i=1
ˆ U 
i(ˆ xi)xi
for every feasible allocation x.
Next is the analogue of the Pigou bound (Deﬁnition 2.12) for resource allocation
games. Thisdeﬁnitionisprimarilymotivatedbytheupperboundonthepriceofanar-
chy provided by Example 3.4; we state it in a form that also permits easy application
of Proposition 3.10 in the proof of Lemma 3.13 below.
Deﬁnition 3.11. LetUdenotethesetofreal-valued, nonnegative, strictlyincreasing,
continuously differentiable, and concave (utility) functions. Deﬁne the JT bound β
by
β = inf
U∈U
inf
C>0
inf
0≤ˆ x,x∗≤C
U(ˆ x)+ ˆ U (ˆ x)(x∗ −ˆ x)
U(x∗)
, (9)Potential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1085
where ˆ U is deﬁned as in (8), as a function of U and C.
In the rest of this section, we show that the JT bound is exactly the worst price of
anarchy occurring in resource allocation games, and explicitly compute the bound.
Lemma 3.12. For every ε>0, there is a resource allocation game with price of
anarchy at most β + ε, where β is the JT bound.
Lemma 3.13. In every resource allocation game, the price of anarchy is at least the
JT bound β.
Lemma 3.14. The JT bound β is exactly 3/4.
Lemmas 3.12–3.14 give an explicit optimal bound on the price of anarchy in
resource allocation games.
Theorem 3.15 ([20]). In every resource allocation game, the price of anarchy is at
least 3/4. Moreover, this bound is tight.
We now prove Lemmas 3.12–3.14 in turn.
Proof of Lemma 3.12. Fix a choice of a utility function U, a capacity C>0, and
values for ˆ x,x∗ ∈[ 0,C]. We aim to exhibit a resource allocation game with price of
anarchy (arbitrarily close to)
U(ˆ x)+ ˆ U (ˆ x)(x∗ −ˆ x)
U(x∗)
. (10)
Recall from (8) that ˆ U (ˆ x) = U (ˆ x)·[1−(ˆ x/C)]. A calculation shows that (10) is at
least 1 if ˆ x ≥ x∗, so we can assume that ˆ x<x ∗. Since (10) is decreasing in C,w e
can assume that C = x∗.
Deﬁne a resource allocation game in which the capacity is C, the ﬁrst user has
the utility function U1(x1) = U(x1), and the other n − 1 users each have the linear
utility function Ui(xi) = ˆ U (ˆ x) · xi. Giving all of the capacity to the ﬁrst user is
a feasible allocation with efﬁciency U1(C) = U(x∗). Arguing as in Example 3.4,
the equilibrium allocation has efﬁciency approaching U1(ˆ x) + (C −ˆ x) · ˆ U (ˆ x) =
U(ˆ x)+ ˆ U (ˆ x)(x∗−ˆ x)as the number n of users tends to inﬁnity. The price of anarchy
in this family of instances thus tends to (at most) the expression in (10) as n →∞ ,
completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 3.13. Let (U1,...,U n,C)be a resource allocation game. Let x∗
and ˆ x denote optimal and equilibrium allocations, respectively. Deﬁne the modiﬁed
utility function ˆ Ui as in (8). The lemma follows by writing
n 
i=1
Ui(x∗
i ) ≤
n 
i=1

1
β

Ui(ˆ xi) + ˆ U 
i(ˆ xi)(x∗
i −ˆ xi)


≤
1
β
n 
i=1
Ui(ˆ xi),1086 Tim Roughgarden
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Deﬁnition 3.11 and the second from Proposi-
tion 3.10. 
Proof of Lemma 3.14. Setting U to the identity function, ˆ x = 1/2, and C = x∗ = 1
shows that the JT bound is at most 3/4. Now ﬁx arbitrary choices of U, C, and
ˆ x,x∗ ∈[ 0,C]. We need to show that (10) is at least 3/4. As in the proof of
Lemma 3.12, we can assume that ˆ x<x ∗ = C. We can then write
U(ˆ x)+ ˆ U (ˆ x)(x∗ −ˆ x) = U(ˆ x)+

1 −
ˆ x
x∗

U (ˆ x)(x∗ −ˆ x)
≥ U(ˆ x)+

1 −
ˆ x
x∗

U(x∗) − U(ˆ x)

=

ˆ x
x∗

· U(ˆ x)+

1 −
ˆ x
x∗

· U(x∗)
≥

ˆ x
x∗
2
· U(x∗) +

1 −
ˆ x
x∗

· U(x∗)
≥
3
4
· U(x∗),
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ U in (8), the ﬁrst and second
inequalitiesfollowfromtheconcavityandnonnegativityofU,andtheﬁnalinequality
followsfromthefactthatthefunctiony2−y+1isuniquelyminimizedwheny = 1/2.
The proof is complete. 
Remark3.16. TheoriginalproofofTheorem3.15isfairlydifferentthantheonegiven
here. Speciﬁcally, Johari and Tsitsiklis [20] ﬁrst show that the price of anarchy is
minimizedingamesinwhichallusershavelinearutilityfunctions,andthenexplicitly
determine a worst-case example (the same as Example 3.4) by analyzing a linear
program. We instead presented the proof above to further highlight the connections
between resource allocation games and selﬁsh routing networks.
Despite the numerous common features in our analyses of the price of anarchy
in selﬁsh routing networks and in resource allocation games, the precise relationship
betweenthetwomodelsisnotcompletelyunderstood. Inparticular,welackaunifying
analysis of the price of anarchy in the two models.
Open Question 1. Find a compelling generalization of selﬁsh routing networks and
resource allocation games in which the price of anarchy can be analyzed in a uniform
way. Ideally, such a generalization would unify Theorems 2.15 and 3.15, and would
also apply to several of the more general classes of games described in [19], [32].
As with selﬁsh routing networks, we have only scratched the surface of the liter-
ature on the price of anarchy in resource allocation games. For much more on the
subject, including generalizations of these games to general networks, see Johari and
Tsitsiklis [20] and Johari [19].Potential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1087
4. The price of stability in network design games
Ourﬁnalclassofgamesisamodelofnetworkdesignwithselﬁshusers. Thesegames
sharesomefeatureswithselﬁshroutingnetworks,butalsodifferinafewfundamental
respects.
4.1. The model. In this section we study Shapley network design games, ﬁrst pro-
posed by Anshelevich et al. [1]. The game occurs in a directed graph G = (V,E),
in which each edge e ∈ E has a ﬁxed nonnegative cost ce. There is a ﬁnite set of
k selﬁsh players, and each player i ∈{ 1,2,...,k} is identiﬁed with a source-sink
vertex pair (si,t i). Let Pi denote the set of simple si-ti paths.
Each player i chooses a path Pi ∈ Pi from its source to its destination. This
creates a network

V,

i Pi

, and we deﬁne the cost of this outcome as
c(P1,...,P k) =

e∈

i Pi
ce. (11)
We assume that this cost is shared among the players in the following way. First, if
edge e lies in fe of the chosen paths, then each player choosing such a path pays a
proportional share πe = ce/fe of the cost. The overall cost ci(P1,...,P k) to player i
is then the sum

e∈Pi πe of these proportional shares. Selﬁsh players naturally
attempt to minimize their incurred cost.
We next deﬁne our notion of equilibria for Shapley network design games. In
contrast to selﬁsh routing networks and resource allocation games, these network
design games are ﬁnite games – there is a ﬁnite set of players, each with a ﬁnite set of
strategies. This is the classical setting for Nash equilibria [25]. As in Deﬁnition 3.1,
we use P−i to denote the vector of strategies chosen by the players other than i.
Deﬁnition 4.1. An outcome (P1,...,P k) of a Shapley network design game is a
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium if for every player i,
ci(Pi,P −i) = min
˜ Pi∈Pi
ci( ˜ Pi,P −i).
In a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, every player chooses a single strategy. In
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, a player can randomize over several strategies.
We will not discuss mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in this survey, though the price of
anarchy of such equilibria has been studied in different models (see e.g. [3], [23]).
Example 4.2 ([2]). Consider the network shown in Figure 3. There are k players,
each with the same source s and sink t. The edge costs are k and 1 + ε, where ε>0
is arbitrarily small. In the minimum-cost outcome, all players choose the lower edge.
ThisoutcomeisalsoaNashequilibrium. Ontheotherhand,supposealloftheplayers
choose the upper edge. Each player i then incurs cost 1, and if player i deviates to
the lower edge it pays the full cost of 1 + ε. This outcome is thus a second Nash
equilibrium, and it has cost k.1088 Tim Roughgarden
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Figure 3. Multiple Nash equilibria in Shapley network design games (Example 4.2).
Example 4.2 shows that Shapley network design games are more ill-behaved than
selﬁshroutingnetworksandresourceallocationgamesinafundamentalrespect: there
can be multiple equilibria, and different equilibria can have very different objective
functionvalues. (Cf.,Theorem2.3andProposition3.8.) Thedeﬁnitionofthepriceof
anarchy is ambiguous in games with multiple equilibria – we would like to quantify
the inefﬁciency of an equilibrium, but of which one?
The price of anarchy is historically deﬁned as the ratio between the objective
function value of the worst equilibrium and that of an optimal solution [23], [26].
Thisdeﬁnitionisnaturalfromtheperspectiveofworst-caseanalysis. InExample4.2,
the price of anarchy is (arbitrarily close to) k. It is also easy to show that the price of
anarchy in every Shapley network design game is at most k.
In this section, we instead focus on the ratio between the cost of the best Nash
equilibrium of a Shapley network design game and that of an optimal solution. This
measure is called the price of stability [1]. Our motivation is twofold. First, as
Example 4.2 shows, the price of anarchy is large and trivial to determine. Second, the
price of stability has a reasonably natural interpretation in network design games – if
we envision the network as being designed by a central authority for subsequent use
by selﬁsh players, then the best Nash equilibrium is an obvious solution to propose.
In this sense, the price of stability measures the necessary degradation in solution
quality caused by imposing the game-theoretic constraint of stability. See [1], [2],
[6], [7] for further discussion and examples of the price of stability.
The price of stability in Example 4.2 is 1. We conclude this subsection with an
example showing that this is not always the case.
Example 4.3 ([1]). Consider the network shown in Figure 4. There are k players, all
with the same sink t, and ε>0 is arbitrarily small. For each i ∈{ 1,2,...,k}, the
edge (si,t)has cost 1/i. In the minimum-cost outcome, each player i chooses the
path si → v → t and the cost is 1+ε. This is not a Nash equilibrium, as player k can
decrease its cost from (1+ε)/k to 1/kby switching to the direct path sk → t. More
generally,thisdirectpathisadominantstrategyforthekthplayer–itistheminimum-
cost strategy, independent of the paths chosen by the other players. It follows that
in every Nash equilibrium, the kth player selects its direct path. Arguing inductivelyPotential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1089
about the players k − 1,k− 2,...,1, we ﬁnd that the unique Nash equilibrium is
the outcome in which each player i chooses its direct path si → t to the sink. The
cost of this outcome is exactly the kth harmonic number Hk =
k
i=1(1/i), which
is roughly lnk. The price of stability can therefore be (arbitrarily close to) Hk in
Shapley network design games.
. . . 
. . . 
. . . 
t
11 /21 /31 /(k − 1) 1/k
s1 s2 s3 sk−1 sk
1 + ε
v
00 00 0
Figure4. ThepriceofstabilityinShapleynetworkdesigngamescanbeatleastHk (Example4.3).
4.2. A potential function for Nash equilibria. In this subsection we use a potential
function to prove the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and upper bound
the price of stability in Shapley network design games. Recall that for both selﬁsh
routingnetworksandresourceallocationgames,wedesignedpotentialfunctionsusing
a characterization of optimal solutions as a guide (see Propositions 2.6 and 3.6). In
Shapleynetworkdesigngames,computinganoptimalsolutionisanNP-hardnetwork
design problem [15], and we cannot expect to ﬁnd an analogous characterization.
There are two ways that Shapley network design games differ from selﬁsh routing
networksthatpreventthecharacterizationofoptimalsolutions(Proposition2.6)from
carrying over. First, there are a ﬁnite number of players in the former model, and a
continuum of players in the latter model. Second, cost functions in selﬁsh routing
networksarenondecreasing, whereasShapleynetworkdesigngameseffectivelyhave
cost functions that are decreasing in the “congestion” – if x ≥ 1 players use an edge e
with ﬁxed cost ce, then the per-player cost on that edge is ce/x.
On the bright side, the potential function (2) for selﬁsh routing networks is easily
modiﬁed to account for these two differences. First, note that this function   remains
well-deﬁnedfordecreasingcostfunctions. Second,passingfromaninﬁniteplayerset
to a ﬁnite one merely involves changing the integrals in (2) to sums. This motivates1090 Tim Roughgarden
the following proposal for a potential function for a Shapley network design game:
 ND(P1,...,P k) =

e∈E
fe 
i=1
ce
i
, (12)
where fe denotes the number of paths Pi that include edge e. While equilibria in
selﬁsh routing networks and resource allocation games can be characterized as the
global optima of their respective potential functions (2) and (7), we will see that
the Nash equilibria of a Shapley network design game are characterized as the local
optima of the potential function (12). This idea is originally due to Rosenthal [29],
[30], who also considered the broader context of “atomic congestion games”.
Thenextlemma,whichiscrucialfortherestofthissection,statesthatthepotential
function “tracks” the change in cost experienced by a deviating player.
Lemma 4.4 ([1], [30]). Let (G,c) denote a Shapley network design game with k
players and  ND the corresponding potential function (12). Let i ∈{ 1,2,...,k} be
a player, and let (Pi,P −i) and ( ˜ Pi,P −i) denote two outcomes that differ only in the
strategy chosen by the ith player. Then
ci( ˜ Pi,P −i) − ci(Pi,P −i) =  ND( ˜ Pi,P −i) −  ND(Pi,P −i). (13)
Proof. Let fe denote the number of players that choose a path containing the edge e
in the outcome (Pi,P −i). Then both sides of (13) are equal to

e∈ ˜ Pi\Pi
ce
fe + 1
−

e∈Pi\ ˜ Pi
ce
fe
.

In the game theory literature, equation (13) is often taken as the deﬁnition of a
potential function in the context of ﬁnite games. See Monderer and Shapley [24] for
a fairly general treatment of potential functions for ﬁnite games.
While simple, Lemma 4.4 has a number of non-trivial consequences. First, Nash
equilibriaofaShapleynetworkdesigngamearethelocalminimaofthecorresponding
potential function. Formally, two outcomes of a Shapley network design game are
neighborsiftheydifferinatmostonecomponent, andanoutcomeisalocalminimum
of  ND if it has no neighbor with strictly smaller potential function value.
Corollary 4.5 ([1], [30]). An outcome of a Shapley network design game is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is a local minimum of the corresponding potential func-
tion  ND.
Proof. Immediate from the deﬁnitions and Lemma 4.4. 
Since every Shapley network design game has a ﬁnite number of outcomes, its
corresponding potential function has a global (and hence local) minimum.Potential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1091
Corollary 4.6 ([1], [30]). In every Shapley network design game, there is at least one
(pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium.
We note in passing that several related classes of network games do not always
have pure-strategy Nash equilibria [2], [6], [13], [30].
A stronger version of Corollary 4.6 also holds. In a ﬁnite game, better-response
dynamics refers to the following process: start with an arbitrary initial outcome;
if the current outcome is not a Nash equilibrium, pick an arbitrary player that can
decrease its cost by switching strategies, update its strategy to an arbitrary superior
one,andrepeat. Better-responsedynamicsterminateifandonlyifaNashequilibrium
is reached. Even in extremely simple two-player games, better-response dynamics
need not terminate (e.g., in “rock-paper-scissors”). On the other hand, the potential
function (12) ensures that such dynamics always converge in Shapley network design
games.
Corollary 4.7 ([1], [30]). In every Shapley network design game, better-response
dynamics always converges to a Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of iterations.
Proof. By Lemma 4.4, every iteration of better-response dynamics strictly decreases
the value of the potential function  ND. Better-response dynamics therefore cannot
visit an outcome more than once and eventually terminates, necessarily at a Nash
equilibrium. 
Corollary 4.7 does not address the number of iterations required to reach a Nash
equilibrium; see [1], [12] for further study of this issue.
Finally,thepotentialfunction(12)hasdirectconsequencesforthepriceofstability
inShapleynetworkdesigngames. Comparingthedeﬁnitionsofcost(11)andpotential
function value (12) of such a game, we have
c(P1,...,P k) ≤  ND(P1,...,P k) ≤ Hk · c(P1,...,P k) (14)
for every outcome (P1,...,P k). As a result, a global minimum of the potential
function  ND of a Shapley network design game is both a Nash equilibrium (by
Corollary 4.6) and has cost at most Hk times that of optimal (by the argument in the
proof of Theorem 2.10). This gives the following theorem
Theorem 4.8 ([1]). In every k-player Shapley network design game, the price of
stability is at most Hk.
A similar argument shows that the bound of Hk in Theorem 4.8 applies to every
Nash equilibrium reachable from an optimal solution via better-response dynamics.
TheboundalsocarriesovertonumerousextensionsofShapleynetworkdesigngames;
see [1] for details.
Example 4.3 shows that the bound in Theorem 4.8 is tight for every k ≥ 1. Thus,
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of a potential function argument yields an optimal upper bound on the inefﬁciency of
equilibria.
The upper bound in Theorem 4.8 is not optimal for some important special cases
of Shapley network design games, however. For example, suppose we insist that the
underlying network G is undirected. There is no known analogue of Example 4.3 for
undirected Shapley network design games – the best lower bound known on the price
of stability in such games is 2. On the other hand, it is not clear how to signiﬁcantly
improve the Hk bound in Theorem 4.8 for undirected networks.
Open Question 2. Determine the largest-possible price of stability in undirected
Shapley network design games.
5. Conclusion
This survey has discussed three natural types of games: selﬁsh routing networks,
resource allocation games, and Shapley network design games. These classes of
gamesdifferfromeachother, bothconceptuallyandtechnically, inanumberofways.
Despite this, the worst-case inefﬁciency of selﬁsh behavior is fairly well understood
in all of these models, and in each case can be determined using a potential function
characterization of equilibria.
While the entire ﬁeld of algorithmic game theory is still in a relatively nascent
stage, several broad research agendas are emerging. For the problem of quantifying
the inefﬁciency of noncooperative equilibria, a central research issue is to understand
characteristics of games that guarantee approximately optimal equilibria, and to de-
velop ﬂexible mathematical techniques for proving such guarantees. While many
research accomplishments from the past few years have improved our understanding
of these intertwined goals, there is clearly much left to be done. Perhaps the current
state of the art in bounding the inefﬁciency of equilibria can be compared to the ﬁeld
of approximation algorithms circa twenty-ﬁve years ago, when the most fundamental
problemsandthemostpowerfulalgorithmictechniques(suchaslinearprogramming)
were only beginning to crystallize. Motivated by this analogy, we conclude with the
following question: will potential functions be as ubiquitous in bounds on the in-
efﬁciency of equilibria as linear programming is in bounds on the performance of
approximation algorithms?
OpenQuestion3. Wehaveseenthatapotentialfunctioncharacterizationofequilibria
leads a bound on the inefﬁciency of equilibria. Under what conditions and to what
extent does a converse hold? When does a bound on the inefﬁciency of the equilibria
of a game imply the existence of some form of a potential function for the game?Potential functions and the inefﬁciency of equilibria 1093
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